The supply chain connecting biofuel processing firms and suppliers of biomass is evolving, and processors face a choice in the collection and pricing strategies they will employ to procure biomass. One option is to pay a single price for biomass collected field-side (processor collection). Another is to pay a single price for biomass at the plant gate (supplier delivery). The literature in this area is relatively young, but there is a sense that the evolution of contracting and pricing structures will dictate the industry's success, and ultimately the costs of producing biofuels from dedicated and non-dedicated energy crops. We examine the collection and pricing choices for a cost-minimizing cellulosic biofuel processor, who initially has monopsony power in feedstock procurement in their collection area. We derive optimal prices, total expenditures on feedstocks, and the collection areas required to meet a processor's fixed input needs. We show that while societal welfare is greatest under supplier delivery; however, the processor will be indifferent between supplier delivery and processor collection unless they are concerned about entry of a competing processor. When this is the case, the processor can use the processorcollection mechanism as an effective deterrent to entry. Numerical simulation based on corn stover for biomass is used to illustrate optimal pricing and the extent of biomass collection areas for different procurement and pricing strategies. We use these findings to calculate the rates at which collection costs increase for a monopsonistic stover processor constrained to a defined procurement area, as might emerge as the industry moves towards commercialization. The derived marginal cost curve for a monopsonistic processor of stover is compared with the marginal cost curve across alternative feedstocks.
Introduction
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Commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol production is a priority under the existing U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), calling for nearly 16 billion gallons from cellulosic biomass including grasses, trees, agricultural residues, and municipal waste (Bracmort, 2015) . The literature on the availably of cellulosic feedstock, including U.S. Department of Energy (Downing et al. 2011 ), Ogden and Anderson (2011) , Graham et al. (2007) , Archer and Johnson (2012) , and Dumortier (2015) , focuses on whether sufficient cellulosic feedstocks will be physically available to meet the mandate. Common assumptions in this literature are 100% participation in supplying available feedstocks and homogenous producers. However, firms with industry experience in cellulosic biomass markets report that quantity supplied from producers is not equal to physical availability of feedstock (Sesmero et al. 2015 , Rosburg et al. 2016 , which further suggests the supply curve for cellulosic feedstock will be different than that for corn ethanol and other dedicated feedstocks. 2 The U.S. Department of Energy "U.S. Billion-Ton Update" study (Downing et al., 2011) suggests that to meet the total advanced biofuels mandate in the RFS, approximately 66 million 2 The distinction between dedicated and non-dedicated energy crops is important to understanding how markets for biomass function. A dedicated energy crop (such as switchgrass) is grown for purposes of providing an energy feed source. Corn stover, on the other hand, is a non-dedicated crop in that it a by-product of corn production. This is a key distinction for our purposes, because producers who commit to dedicated energy crops must find a buyer for their production. Corn stover and other agricultural residues are not valued as a primary crop, and therefore it is not essential that the byproduct be marketed. Therefore, monopsonistic processors may not be able to exercise pricing power in markets for non-dedicated energy crops as they are likely to for dedicated energy crops.
tons of corn stover will be needed annually. This equates to approximately 50% of the total annual stover produced by Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, and Minnesota-the four largest corn producing states (Sesmero et al., 2015) . However, experience suggests that participation rates are likely closer to 20%-25%, largely due to stover's status as a residual "second crop" and because suppliers are heterogeneous in their willingness to supply stover. 3, 4 This manuscript examines the biofuel processor's feedstock procurement choices and price strategies and characterizes optimal prices, total expenditures, and collection areas required to meet known production quantities. We consider two cases of spatial pricing, each indicating a specific procurement arrangement. In the first, a monopsonistic biofuel processor pays a single price for feedstock delivered to the plant by the supplier. We refer to this as the supplierdelivery model. In the second, the processor collects feedstock from suppliers and pays a single price to all suppliers. This is the processor-collection model. Distinguishing between these 3 Based on insights from two stover-based cellulosic ethanol plans in Iowa: POET-DSM in Emmetsburg, Iowa, and DuPont Cellulosic in Nevada, Iowa. 4 Heterogeneous reservation values are generated by characteristics such as variations in crop rotations, availability of livestock manure, and subjective values of stover based on farmer perceptions. These characteristics influence the opportunity cost of removing the stover from the field because, under some circumstances, stover has fertilizer and carbon value related to the presence of livestock or other enterprises. This value is highest on corn-soybean rotations and lowest under continuous corn, and where livestock manure is applied (Pieper 2015 ). In our model and analysis, we assume land units are homogeneous and that heterogeneity in reservation prices of stover derive from factors related to production choices and preferences of the producer.
pricing strategies is motivated in two ways: 1) the feedstock price will determine participation rates when producers have heterogeneous reservation values, and 2) pricing strategies that are favorable to the supplier may be used by a firm to deter potential competition for feedstocks.
Our study is motivated by and draws on the experience of two of the only large-scale cellulosic ethanol processors-POET-DSM (20 mga) and DuPont (30 mga)-both of which are located in Iowa and use agricultural residues (i.e., corn stover) as a feedstock. 5, 6 The plants are similar in capacity, initial capital investment, and operate in an area with similar production characteristics, yet have chosen different collection and pricing mechanisms. The choice of collection method is a strategic one and depends on the processor's expectations of competition, producer participation, and collection and transportation costs. That two processors operating under similar conditions have chosen different collection strategies suggests the industry has not settled on an optimal procurement strategy. We rely on a basic spatial pricing theory to analyze market outcomes under different procurement models with the goal of providing evidence about how the industry's cost structure may evolve as policies related to the mandated expansion of the industry are implemented. A key result is that while a processor is indifferent between the two procurement models when there is no competition for feedstocks, it will find an advantage in switching to a processor-collection model to deter potential competition as the industry 5 The institutional details of these plants and their operational dimensions are described in a later section. 
approaches capacity utilization of a feedstocks. This has implications for overall system welfare and costs.
Following a review of the relevant literature, our study proceeds as follows. First, we use a cost-minimization framework within a simple line model for each of the collection strategies and compare optimal prices, collection distances, and procurement costs given a known feedstock requirement. Three propositions related to the procurement system are presented, which show that in the absence of competition, the processor is indifferent between processor collection and supplier delivery, but that welfare is higher under supplier delivery. In a situation where the potential for competition for feedstocks exists, we use a sequential game with backward induction to characterize the optimal procurement strategy of each firm. Second, we use numerical simulation to trace a marginal cost curve for a monopsonistic processor under each collection mechanism to highlight that input and collection costs increase as additional feedstock supplies are needed. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our findings in the context of the current RFS and other research that estimates the marginal cost of biofuels. The slope of the marginal cost curve for the monopsonistic processor is compared with the slope of the cost curve across other feedstocks. The results suggest that substantial quantities of these non-stover feedstocks may be required to meet the mandate.
Spatial pricing in the literature
In the market for cellulosic biomass, the ability of processors to engage in spatial price discrimination, coupled with supplier heterogeneity, will drive a processor's choice of procurement and pricing strategy. The question of procurement and price strategies-where in the market space product ownership is transferred and who bears transportation responsibility-
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has been examined for a number of products and market situations, from perfect competition to monopoly/monopsony, and premised on varying degrees of information exchange (Hoover, 1937; Greenhut and Greenhut, 1975; Beckman, 1976; Greenhut et al., 1980; Balcer, 1983; Aguirre et al., 1998 , Sesmero 2015 , 2016 .
The spatial pricing literature can be thought of in two broad strands. In one, where the market is characterized by sellers pricing an output, there are potentially many sellers, and each contemplates competitive and spatial factors in determining its optimal pricing and delivery mechanism. The second, and the one on which our investigation focuses, focuses on procurement markets, particularly like those in agriculture, which are fundamentally different than other output markets. In procurement markets, many sellers exist but pricing is largely determined by one or few buyers (processors) with market power.
Common pricing nomenclature for spatially differentiated products are free on board (FOB), uniform delivered (UD) and optimal discriminatory pricing or partial freight absorption (OD). In procurement markets, FOB pricing (also known as mill pricing) involves a single bid at the processor's plant (plant gate) and suppliers (farmers) are responsible for the cost of transporting their output to the processor. This is analogous to our supplier-delivery procurement method and is the convention in the procurement of agricultural commodities including corn, soybeans, and wheat. UD pricing in procurement markets-analogous to our processorcollection method-reverses FOB pricing: all suppliers receive the same price for their output and the processor bears the transportation cost from farm gate to plant gate. to allow the processor to absorb partial transportation costs, and in that case the single-price assumption can be relaxed. Second, we solve a cost minimization problem subject to a capacity constraint whereas the literature has focused on profit maximization. 8 A reviewer notes that OD pricing in mature monopsonistic procurement markets is the likely outcome, and Sesmero (2016) documents the efficiency of partial freight absorption. The market for stover is not established and the firms we model have not evolved beyond the simpler pricing schemes we present. Further, there is reason to doubt that partial freight absorption is possible in the market for stover given how producers currently evaluate its value and its status as residual crop. We limit our study to the FOB (supplier delivery) and UD (processor collection) cases.
Pricing with partial freight absorption in the procurement for non-dedicated biomass is a topic for future research.
firms that compete spatially for inputs. As competition becomes less intensive, firms will move toward partial freight absorption, where the amount of freight absorbed is decreasing as space becomes more important. In local monopsony, pricing converges to OD.
Until recently, the bulk of theoretical and applied work in procurement markets has focused on commoditized agricultural outputs, including grain and milk. By comparison, the literature considering procurement of agricultural residues and other feedstocks for cellulosic biofuel is relatively young. Examples of stover-based investigations include Petrolia (2008), Perrin et al. (2012) , Altman et al. (2015) , Sesmero et al. (2015) , Rosburg et al. (2016) , and Sesmero (2016) . Because the industry lacks commercial scale and is also without significant competition for feedstocks, these and other studies focus on price and supply in a monopsonistic context and ignore producer supply responses and processor pricing behavior. Sesmero et al. (2015) argue that while for now the spatial monopsony context for biomass feedstock may be appropriate, relying on estimates of market extent, supply, and participation from studies that do not consider competition may lead to false inferences about the true availability and cost of stover-based biofuels in competition. Their work uses data from Indiana to compare stover pricing and biofuel production and costs with participation (supply) feedback across markets structures, including duopsony, monopsony, and three-firm oligopsony. Their results suggest that competition for feedstocks by profit-maximizing firms increases feedstock prices and surpluses to producers, thereby increasing feedstock and biofuel production costs.
They note that their study ignores strategic behavior when entry by other firms is possible, presumes profit maximizing behavior of firms, and focuses only on FOB pricing. Other works that allow for a participation response from feedstock suppliers include Altman et al. (2015) and Rosburg et al. (2016) . Both find that producers' participation in supplying biomass is not
particularly sensitive to price increases, which further suggests an importance of understanding the trade-off in collection distances versus paying a higher price for feedstock. Our work is positioned in this growing literature and fills a gap identified by Sesmero et al. (2015) in the need to investigate alternative delivery regimes as a form of strategic behavior while at the same time incorporating supplier heterogeneity.
Methods
A model of biomass procurement for biofuel processing
We model the procurement strategies of a cost-minimizing corn stover processor following the spatial price theories developed by French (1960) and refined by Greenhut et al. (1987) . We assume a fixed and exogenous plant capacity. Processors minimize the cost of procuring the necessary feedstock to meet operating targets by choosing a price to pay for feedstock, either purchased field side (processor collection) or delivered to the plant (supplier delivery).
Feedstock supply and procurement are analyzed using a simple line model, where land units that supply feedstock are uniformly located on a line segment, with the processor at one end. 9 Land units are homogeneous in their production of feedstock (i.e., each land unit has equal feedstock yield), and we normalize this to a total quantity available of one. 10 Within a land unit are suppliers who, because they have varying reservation values for feedstock, are heterogeneous in their willingness to supply. These suppliers are uniformly distributed within the land unit.
A processor with fixed and known production quantity, , buys feedstock land units from the plant such that production is satisfied. Here, is both the distance to the last land unit and a total number of land units supplying stover, where each land unit is located distance from the plant, and ≤ . Transportation costs per unit per mile, , are assumed equivalent for processors and suppliers. The net price any supplier receives for feedstock is denoted generically as , and is either a single field-side price, , paid to all suppliers in the case of processor collection or is a delivered plant-gate net price, − , where is the announced price and suppliers differ in their net price by distance from the plant and transportation costs. When the net price of feedstock a supplier receives, or − , exceeds a supplier's reservation value, s/he is willing to sell all of the feedstock produced on that unit. In this way, the proportion of a land unit that supplies feedstock, denoted ( ), is a function of net price and this is also a quantity supplied per land unit for a given price. 11 For simplicity, we assume supply is linear in price, and therefore, ( ) = * is the proportion (quantity) of the available feedstock 10 Assuming the processor is located at one end of a line segment reflects the radius of a circular collection region. If instead the processor is located in the middle of the line segment, our line model presentation and results hold. This is true because land units are homogenous, and distance, R, is an aggregate distance; the processor can collect from units in one direction, opposing directions, or any direction in the case of a circular model. 11 The equivalence between proportion and quantity holds because each land unit is assumed to produce one unit of feedstock.
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supplied per land unit. The processor has collection costs of + for processor collection and under supplier delivery.
Optimal feedstock prices and collection distances are presented for three no-competition scenarios: (a) the processor is able to perfectly price discriminate, paying each supplier his reservation value and uses processor collection; (b) the processor is a single-price monopsonist that collects feedstock field-side and transports it to the plant (processor collection); and, (c) the processor is a single-price monopsonist that buys delivered feedstock at the plant (supplier delivery). We then extend the model to consider processors' procurement choices in a gametheoretic framework when there exists a potential for competition for feedstock. Feedstock prices, collection distances, and total collection costs are compared in a case where an existing processor faces the threat of a potential entrant whose collection method is chosen under competitive conditions.
Perfect price discrimination using processor collection, no competition
Perfect price discrimination, though an unrealistic market outcome, serves the purpose of identifying the competitive price and collection distance with no deadweight loss in the system (Varian, 2009) . It also provides a benchmark against which two of the more likely scenarios-a single-price monopsonist using either supplier-delivered or processor-collection methods-are measured.
A feedstock processor would ideally wish to price discriminate, paying each supplier their unique reservation value for feedstock. The payment to each land unit under this form of price discrimination is given as 2 − ∫ = 0.5 0 2 . When the processor is unable to price discriminate, it must pay each land unit 2 ; therefore, the cost difference, 0.5 2 , is the
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advantage to a processor of this form of price discrimination. Total feedstock expenditures are found by integrating the feedstock cost and transportation over the total collection distance, :
Single-price monopsonist using processor collection, no competition
In the processor collection scenario, the processor is responsible for transporting feedstock to the plant and pays every supplier the same price; thus, the proportion of feedstock collected from a land unit is constant. Given a single price, , and linear supply per land unit, ( ) = and the processor collects from distance = to meet production needs. Total feedstock expenditures are again found by integrating procurement costs over distance: ∫ ( + ) . 
Single-price monopsonist using supplier delivery, no competition
In a supplier-delivered collection model, the processor announces a price of p per unit of feedstock delivered to the plant, such that the price results in participation sufficient to meet the production requirement, . A supplier distance from the processor incurs transportation costs and thus receives a net feedstock price, − . Suppliers nearer to the processor have a transportation cost advantage and receive higher net prices than those further away. The feedstock supply is ( − ) and is not constant across suppliers in the collection area. The proportion of stover supplied will be greatest near the processor and declines to zero at the margin of the collection distance. The processor's total feedstock expenditures are ∫ (
.
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We are interested in comparing optimal prices, * , collection distances, * , and total expenditures to meet a known production, , for the three pricing and collection scenarios.
These are explored with the following propositions. Under processor collection, the expenditure minimization problem to collect feedstock quantity is expressed as . Note that the optimal collection distance for both processor collection and supplier delivery are identical. Total expenditures are * = √2 ( ) 0.5 1.5 , the same as expenditures under the processor collection mechanism. The processor's indifference
between the two models is intuitive: because it cannot price discriminate, it cannot capture the supply efficiencies generated by participation rate effects.
12
Proposition 2: Supplier welfare is higher and total transportation costs are lower under the supplier-delivery model than the processor-collection mechanism.
In either collection mechanism, the payment to the supplier is the difference between the total expenditure of the processor and the cost of transportation. In the processor collection mechanism, the payment to suppliers is ∫ Sesmero (2016) develops a model with a monopsonistic market for an agricultural commodity where the firm has the market power that allows it to offer a plant price that is below the marginal value product and the ability to partially absorb the freight advantage enjoyed by suppliers that are close to the plant. The latter type of power is called spatial price discrimination and involves processor collection. He shows that the socially optimal solution is FOB pricing, and this agrees with our results. However, the privately optimal solution always involves spatial price discrimination. Our results suggest that in the absence of the ability to absorb freight costs, the firm will be indifferent between UD and FOB pricing.
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models. In a single-price monopsony, total expenditures on feedstock collection and * are equivalent, but the share of costs attributable to transport and feedstock varies depending on whether processors collect feedstock or suppliers deliver. This is because participation is driven by net price, and these are not uniform in the supplier-delivery model as they are in processor collection model. Instead, participation is greatest near the plant where transportation costs are lowest. The supplier-delivery model has higher average feedstock payments to suppliers and lower total transportation costs relative to processor collection.
<insert Table 1 here>
By proposition 1, the processor is indifferent between the two collection options because the costs to the processor are equal. However, supplier participation increases closer to the plant under supplier delivery, thereby reducing overall transportation costs. The single price is a limitation that precludes the plant from capturing the efficiencies associated with supplier delivery. Instead, these benefits are captured by suppliers located near the plant-a location rent.
Costs for processors are the same under both mechanisms but societal welfare will be higher with the supplier delivery mechanism. These propositions explain, in part, why supplier delivery pricing (FOB) dominates in the commodity grain market, generating lower transportation costs and higher overall welfare.
Collection strategy as a barrier to entry
The simple analysis above is useful to understand how collection areas and feedstock pricing, and therefore transportation costs and total expenditures, are affected by procurement strategy
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choice. In this section we extend the framework to show optimal pricing and collection distance outcomes for the procurement strategies when there is a potential threat of competition for feedstock in the processor's feedstock area. The optimal solutions are influenced by the distance between processors, which is intuitive. The motivation for considering this case is the need to understand implications of policies that mandate the use of large quantities of cellulosic feedstocks. As the industry expands under the mandate, and as processors move to occupy current gaps or unused feedstock production areas, collection mechanisms will be chosen strategically to deter competition and minimize feedstock procurement costs.
We continue with the line segment model to characterize the nature of the interaction between an existing processor of feedstock (an incumbent) and a new processor (the entrant) who will potentially compete for a portion of the incumbent's feedstock in an overlapping area.
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We assume processors are homogenous with equivalent production technologies, per-unit cost structures, and capacities. Both minimize total collection costs and therefore have identical optimization problems. The firms choose either processor collection or supplier delivery to procure feedstocks.
Processors' pricing and collection choices depend on the distance between them. Let be the distance between two processors: an existing processor and potential entrant. In the single-price monopsonist case, the optimal collection distance is * = ( 2 ) 0.5
. Intuitively, when ≥ 2 * there is no competition and we have shown that the collection distances and total expenditures are equivalent regardless of the collection strategy. However, in cases where ≤ 2 * , there will be competition for feedstocks, and we characterize that competition in what follows.
Let ( ) be the total cost in equilibrium for processor using strategy when the other processor uses strategy . The incumbent (I) and entrant (E) are indexed = ( , ) and , = ( , ) indexes the collection strategies processor collection (P) and supplier delivery (S). The following matrix denotes the potential equilibria:
The interaction between the two processing firms to arrive at optimal prices and collection mechanisms represents a sequential price-leadership framework solved by backward induction. The entrant observes the collection and price strategy of the incumbent and chooses its optimal decision set. Knowing this is how the entrant will respond, the incumbent optimally sets its collection and price strategy to protect feedstocks and deter competition. The four ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT potential equilibria reduce to three strategic combinations shown in the matrix above: (a) both firms use processor collection; (b) both use supplier delivery; and, (c) the incumbent and entrant choose different collection mechanisms.
We first consider how collection costs change as the distance between two plants shrinks.
Greater details of the firms' interactions and collection strategies are provided in the appendix for each of the three strategic combinations.
Proposition 3: The processor collection strategy adds to the feedstock procurement costs of a potential competitor when their optimal collection areas absent competition overlap. Given competition for feedstocks, both processors will optimally choose processor collection to lower total expenditures.
We begin by demonstrating that the incumbent and entrant will choose processor collection when competition for feedstock exists. Let be the collection distance for a processor using processor collection and be the collection distance under supplier delivery; similarly, and are the feedstock prices under supplier deliver and processor collection, respectively. As shown following proposition 2, the total cost for a firm using supplier delivery is a function of collection distance, , and is given by:
, where is the price offered by the processor using supplier delivery. The first order condition of this equation is
0.5 = ± * . When 0 < < * , ′( ) < 0, and we find that the shorter collection distance results in greater collection expenditures.
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In the appendix we show that when the incumbent chooses processor collection, the total cost for the entrant if it also chooses processor collection is 2 2 + 4 . This cost is the same as ( 2 ). If instead the entrant chooses supplier delivery, its total expenditure is as given above,
. Notice that the collection distance for the firm using processor collection is always larger than the collection distance for the firm using supplier delivery, which implies < 2 . Therefore, it must be true that ( ) > ( 2 ). Thus, an entrant's best strategy is to choose processor collection to lower its collection expenditure when the incumbent uses processor collection.
When the incumbent uses supplier delivery, we showed that the entrant's total collection expenditure is . As with ( ), ( ) is decreasing over (0, * ). Since the collection distance for processor collection is always larger than that for supplier delivery, * ≥ > 2 , and therefore, ( ) < ( 2 ). The entrant will optimally choose processor collection to lower its total collection expenditure when it observes the incumbent choosing supplier delivery.
In general, the dominant strategy for a potential entrant that creates competition for feedstock is processor collection, and given the entrant's known best response, the incumbent firm will choose processor collection. This is true because it is more difficult for a firm to poach existing suppliers located at some distance from the plant if the existing processor is using processor collection. An incumbent processor can therefore use processor collection of feedstock as a way to deter an entrant who is considering siting a plant that results in some overlap of ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT required feedstocks. The additional cost of competition compared to the single-price monopsonist occurs because both firms receive only one-half of the feedstock supplied in the area where they compete. They both therefore increase participation nearer to their plants by increasing the price and offering a premium over some suppliers' reservation values to the point at which there is no overlapping area. This increase in collection costs can be treated as the penalty for moving into the collection area of an existing processor, and the penalty increases as the distances between the two decreases.
Simulation of collection models using corn stover feedstock
The theoretical analysis of processor collection and pricing regimes with and without competition for feedstock give useful insight into the tradeoffs that exist between feedstock price and distance (transportation costs) when suppliers are heterogeneous in their reservation values of feedstock. From these simple models and the propositions put forth, we can draw some general conclusions to explain processors' procurement strategy and the associated costs: (a) a processor not facing competition for feedstocks is indifferent between processor collection and supplier delivery because expenditures are equal between the two; (b) similarly, when two firms compete for feedstocks and choose the same collection mechanism, feedstock procurement costs are the same under supplier-delivery and processor-collection; however, supplier-delivery results in higher weighted-average prices in the collection area; and, (c) an incumbent firm can impose a penalty on a potential entrant who will compete for feedstocks by choosing processor collection, thereby adding to the entrant's costs relative to the baseline no-competition scenario.
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These insights derive from a simple line model, where feedstocks are located along a segment between the two processors. In reality, the collection region for a processor will better resemble a circle whose radius we approximate with a line model. The line model generalizes to a circle model by thinking of the line as one of many, each of which connects the center of the circle-the processor's plant-with a point on the circumference of ever-larger circles. In the presented scenarios, collection quantities are obtained by integrating the line from 0 to 2 . Just as expenditures and collection distances are the same for processor collection and supplier delivery in the line model, the optimal collection regions (size) and expenditures are also equivalent for the two collection mechanisms when modeled as a circle.
Closed-form solutions for prices, distances, and expenditures do not exist in all cases if the circular model is used, this is due to the irregular shape of any overlapping areas between processors. To illustrate how collection distances and costs are impacted by the choice of collection strategies when firms compete, we employ simulation techniques using realistic parameters from the experiences of two commercial scale feedstock processors of cellulosic feedstock, both using corn stover for inputs. Each farmer has a unique production situation, and this will determine their participation in stover removal. The experiences of DuPont and POET have been that less than 20% of farmers are willing to participate in stover supply at current prices (Pieper, 2015) . Both processors have collection areas that are larger than originally anticipated that can reach as far as 50 miles from the plant in one direction (Pieper, 2015; Swoboda, 2014) . DuPont utilizes processor-collection contracts in which it collects feedstock field-side and transports it to the plant or storage facilities. It originally expected to collect in a 30-mile radius around the plant.
POET's collection strategy was supplier-delivery, with some utilization of processor collection for those at some distance from the plant.
Simulation of Costs and Distance Based on Experience Parameters
We simulate the collection distances and net prices to suppliers for the three collection strategies absent competition and when competition for feedstocks exists. The simulations rely on a circular feedstock collection area with a processor at the center and distance measured as a straight-line from the processor; the price and participation variables are the same as in the line model presented earlier. To operationalize the model, we use parameters values based on Darr et al. (2013) . 14 Specifically, we assume transportation costs of $0.65 per ton of stover per mile, processor feedstock requirements of 300,000 metric tons per year, a stover removal rate of two 14 Darr et al. (2013) used assumptions based on the DuPont plant in central Iowa.
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metric tons per acre per year, and corn planted on approximately one-third of the total area.
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Simulation results of the optimal collection costs per ton for each of the three collection strategies without competition over a plausible range for are provided in table 3. As an example, for a given supplier response to price changes, = 0.015, the collection radii required is 38 straight-line miles under both the processor collection and supplier delivery model. This participation rate and collection radius is very close to that experienced by the plants; therefore, we base our discussion on the simulation results using = 0.015.
<insert table 3 approximately here>
The simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis and findings that optimal collection distances (radii) are equivalent for the processor collection and supplier delivery mechanisms, and in all cases are higher than what we would observe if the processor was able to perfectly price discriminate. Also, as suppliers become increasingly price-responsive, optimal feedstock prices and collection radii decrease.
Competition for Stover
Given the same parameters used in the simulation above, figure 1 illustrates how the collection costs change as the distance between two processors decreases. Processors can expect costs to reflect that of a single-price monopsonistic processor until the point at which the processors must pay a higher price to suppliers near the plant to compensate for suppliers further away that are lost to the competing firm. Potential entrants will optimally select processing locations such that their required feedstock areas do not overlap. However, as least-cost locations are used and firms are incentivized to use existing stover, some overlap is likely, particularly in light of lower than expected producer participation. Based on our simulation assumptions and the participation rates of suppliers that may happen at approximately 72 miles distance between processors. The important take-away is that competition for feedstock, which may occur as firms are incentivized to utilize existing stover as feedstock, represents a significant cost increase for the industry under processor collection.
<insert figure 1>
In the market we considered, significant increases in cellulosic ethanol from stover will arise only if existing processors increase supply from within their existing collection regions. This is because expansion creating an overlapping area is more costly than procuring stover more intensively within a smaller area closer to the plant due to the significant role of transportation costs associated with stover biomass. The case of competition, modeled using a line market, suggests that the cost increase for an entrant when the incumbent uses processor collection is analogous to expanding supplies intensively. Figure 2 illustrates, using simulation based on a ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT circular market, that procurement costs increase as existing processors increase production needs (capacity) in both the cases of perfect price discrimination and single-price strategies.
< insert figure 2 here>
Discussion and policy relevance
Under the current RFS, mandated parties (blenders) will be required to purchase and use a specific quantity of cellulosic biofuels or purchase Cellulosic Renewable Identification Numbers (CRINs) from another blender that has blended more cellulosic fuel than required. As the cellulosic mandate increases the required production of cellulosic fuel, three possible market responses and effects may emerge. First, new plants may locate at least partially within the procurement region of an existing plant, and in so doing force up the premium for stover and, by extension, the participation rate. As we have shown, the existing plants have available an expensive deterrent to avoid this outcome. Instead, new plants will locate at the edges of the existing collection area. A second potential response is that existing plants expand within their current collection area by increasing the price for stover. We show that this is possible, but that the slope of the marginal cost curve for these monopsonistic plants is very steep. A third alternative is to accept that participation rates for corn stover will remain low and then the additional raw material will come from sources other than corn stover. Here, we show using back-of-the-envelope calculations that the third outcome is most likely.
The simulation shows that a doubling of production from, for example, 30 million gallons to 60 million gallons increases procurement from $41.84 to $62.71-a 50% increase. Ogden and Anderson (2011) develop the supply curve for all possible sources of cellulose. Corn stover (agricultural wastes) occupy the lower end of the supply curve and result in costs that max out at ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT $3.00 per gallon. Perennial grasses then enter the feedstock supply option at up to $3.80 a gallon.
Moving from $3.00 per gallon to $3.50 per gallon, production doubles from approximately 10 billion gallons of gasoline equivalent to 20 billion gallons of gasoline equivalent. The 16.6%
increase from $3.00 per gallon to $3.50 per gallon is much lower than the 50% increase in costs for monopsonistic stover processors who double production. Taken together, these results suggest that there is a place for cellulosic sources other than corn stover under the existing mandate.
Conclusion
The production of cellulosic biofuel involves bulky raw material, capital-intensive processing plants, feedstock producers (suppliers) who are heterogeneous with respect to the price at which they are willing to sell raw material, and large transportation costs. These circumstances are different than the experiences of the corn ethanol industry. The first two commercial scale plants have demonstrated a willingness to accept very large feedstock collection areas and low producer participation in supplying stover. They have also introduced a collection mechanism that relies on the use of plant-owned equipment, and this runs counter to the mechanism used in the grain industry where grain producers deliver to plants.
Our analysis finds that plants are behaving rationally given their monopsonistic status.
The use of a supplier-delivery model is expected in cases when there is no competition for feedstock because though the processor is indifferent, suppliers receive higher net prices in total under supplier delivery versus processor collection. We also find that processor collection can be used as a deterrent to new plants who are considering siting a plant with a procurement area that overlaps an incumbent firm. The intuition behind this is that under supplier delivery,
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feedstock suppliers at the edge of a processor's collection region are easily poached. Under processor collection, these producers can only be poached if the entrant processor engages in a costly price war with the incumbent processor.
The policy implications of the RFS mandate on least-cost feedstock use can be informed by our results. We learned from the experience of two processors that availability is not equal to supply. Processors' procurement radii in a circular market are larger than anticipated and participation is far lower than the 100% assumed in some of the early studies. Low participation is likely to prevail because monopsonistic processors optimally accept larger procurement area rather than pay a premium to increase participation closer to the plant. Taken together, these results suggest that stover does not represent a lowest-cost feedstock to meet the cellulosic mandate and that other feedstock sources will therefore be required. Table 1 The collection distance in this scenario is illustrated as follows:
Tables and Figures
The quantity of feedstock collected by the incumbent is:
(1) ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 0.5 ( ).
Similarly, the quantity collected by entrant is:
(2) ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 0.5 ( ).
The spatial pricing literature is clear that an equilibrium cannot be an overlapping market because a buyer can increase the price by a small amount and capture all of the suppliers. It can be shown that for both IE pp  and IE pp  there is no competition because any potential overlapping feedstock draw region is dominated by the higher price processor and the equilibrium result is the strategy for the single processor model. We present the mechanics of this adjustment for readers who are unfamiliar with the spatial pricing literature. The total collection costs for each processor is calculated by integrating total feedstock and transportation costs in the non-overlapping area and allocating each processor one-half of the feedstock, and therefore costs, in the overlapping area, such that: . Thus, relative to the case of no competition, each processor optimally collects more intensely from suppliers close to it by increasing the collection price and therefore supplier participation. The intuition is that it is less expensive to pay marginally more more to ensure sufficient supplies within a nearby and exclusive draw area than to collect stover from a distant draw area that is shared with another firm. The resulting equilibrium collection distance is illustrated:
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Total collection costs for the incumbent and entrant are: . Each processor's quantity collected is expressed using distances: 
Research Highlights
We examine the collection and pricing choices for a cost-minimizing cellulosic biofuel processor, who initially has monopsony power in feedstock procurement (corn stover) in their collection area and chooses between processor-collection pricing and supplier-delivery pricing.
We find:
 Societal welfare is greatest under supplier delivery; the use of a supplier-delivery model is expected in cases when there is no competition for feedstock because though the processor is indifferent, suppliers receive higher net prices in total under supplier delivery versus processor collection.
 A processor can use the processor-collection mechanism as an effective deterrent to entry by a competing firm.
 Based on simulations and experiences of processor with low participation by producers of stover, low participation prevails because monopsonistic processors optimally accept larger procurement area rather than pay a premium to increase participation closer to the plant.
 Our results suggest that corn stover does not represent a lowest-cost feedstock to meet the cellulosic mandate and that other feedstock sources will therefore be required.
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